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TRADITION, PRECEDENT,
AND JUSTICE SCALIA
David A. Strauss*
We knew from the start that Justice Scalia was not a great fan of
stare decisis. During his first Term on the Supreme Court, there was
a period of a little over a month in which he called for overruling five
major precedents.' The trend has not abated: last Term he again
urged that at least five major cases be overruled,2 and he explicitly
confined a sixth to its facts.'
There are other indications, too, besides the votes to overrule
cases. In his opinion for the Court last Term in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith 4-which, if it is followed,
will be the most important decision on the free exercise of religion in a

generation-Justice Scalia cited (twice) Minersville School District v.
Gobitis.5 Gobitis upheld a state law that required schoolchildren to
salute the flag. Justice Scalia did not mention that Gobitis was overruled by one of the most celebrated civil liberties decisions in history,
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.6 It is, to draw the
* Professor of Law, the University of Chicago. I gave an earlier version of this paper at
the conference on Justice Scalia at Cardozo Law School on October 29, 1990, and I am grateful to the participants in the conference for their comments. The Russell Baker Scholars Fund
and the Russell J. Parsons Faculty Research Fund at the University of Chicago Law School
provided financial support.
I See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling for
the overruling of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483
U.S. 219 (1987) (overruling Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1861)); Solorio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (overruling O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)); Tyler Pipe
Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299
(1852)); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (overruling
Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)).
2 See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling
for the overruling of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)); Rutan v. Republican Party, 110
S. Ct. 2729, 2746 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling for the overruling of Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507 (1980) and Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)); Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct.
3047, 3067 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refusing to follow Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976)); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (calling for the overruling of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
3 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)
(limiting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
4 Id.
5 310 U.S. 586 (1940), cited twice in Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
6 319 U.S. 624 (1943). To be sure, Gobitis, like Smith, addressed the question whether the
free exercise clause of the first amendment required an exemption from a general requirement,
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obvious comparison, a little like citing Plessy v. Ferguson7 without
mentioning subsequent developments in the law concerning racial
segregation.
This attitude toward precedent naturally and appropriately
evokes what might be called Burkean criticisms--criticisms that Justice Scalia is not showing the characteristic virtues of the true conservative. Justice Scalia, it is said, is too quick to use abstract
principles that are insensitive to practical realities. His approach is
unsound because it is too cavalier toward the views of past Justices
who have thought carefully about the problems. Discarding precedents at the rate he seeks would disrupt the orderly development of
the law. His readiness to overrule previous cases reflects arrogant
overconfidence in his own capacities.'
No doubt these criticisms are justified to a degree. But another
aspect of Justice Scalia's record seems to confound the Burkean criticism. As brusque as he is in dealing with precedent, Justice Scalia is
positively reverential in his views about tradition. Several of his opinions assign an extraordinarily important role to tradition in the interpretation of the Constitution. This is a paradox: one would expect a
Justice's attitudes toward precedent and tradition to mirror each
other. Both involve the weight that should be attached to what people
living in an earlier time thought about a recurring problem.
In this paper, I will discuss three issues arising out of this apparent paradox. First I will consider whether there is in fact an inconsistency in Justice Scalia's positions. I will argue that there is not: a
strong, classically conservative attachment to tradition can logically
coexist with a disdain for stare decisis. To some degree, Justice
Scalia, despite the way he treats precedent, deserves to be called a
traditionalist, or a Burkean conservative.
Second, is Justice Scalia's attitude toward precedent, taken alone,
properly subject to criticism? My answer again is that it is not. Indeed, the Burkean criticisms of Justice Scalia's approach to precedent-and those are the most telling criticisms to make-serve only
to reinforce Justice Scalia's traditionalism. That leads to the third
argument I will make: that Justice Scalia's traditionalism is far more
while Barnette was based more generally on the free speech clause. But Barnette explicitly
"overruled" Gobitis. See 319 U.S. at 642.
7 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
8 I take EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1789), to be
the exemplar of Burke's traditionalism. For Burkean criticism of Justice Scalia, see Professor
Burt's excellent paper in this symposium. Burt, Precedent and Authority in Anton Scalia's
Jurisprudence,12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1685 (1991) A more general Burkean defense of precedent is Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
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problematic than his views about precedent. Traditionalism of the
kind to which Justice Scalia professes adherence-a kind of traditionalism that in fact Justice Scalia neither consistently follows nor adequately defends-entails positions that no one else today would
accept. The problem with Justice Scalia is that he is too much of a
Burkean, not the opposite.
I.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S TRADITIONALISM

Justice Scalia expressed his views about tradition at some length
in opinions-none of them for a majority of the Court-in three recent cases: Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,9decided in June of 1989, and
Burnham v. Superior Court 10 and Rutan v. Republican Party,"' both
decided last Term.
A.
Burnham is the logical place to begin. The facts of the case are
of limited significance; essentially, a New Jersey resident was served
with process while in California on a brief trip. The question was
whether the due process clause forbade California courts from asserting personal jurisdiction over him. 2
There was no majority opinion. Justice Scalia, who wrote the
plurality opinion, and Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment,
agreed that California could assert personal jurisdiction in the case.
But they engaged in an extended debate over a question of method:
how should the Court go about deciding whether the due process
clause permits states to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
served with process while briefly in the state for reasons unrelated to
the lawsuit? Justice Scalia invoked tradition; 13 Justice Brennan acknowledged that tradition was important, but he relied primarily on
arguments to the effect that allowing states to assert personal jurisdiction in these circumstances was fair and sensible policy. 4
Much of Justice Scalia's opinion was unremarkable. He made a
historical argument that, from the English common-law courts
through current American state courts, personal service of process
within the relevant territory has been recognized as a basis for personal jurisdiction. He claimed to show that "[a]mong the most firmly
9 109 S.Ct. 2333 (1989).
10 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990).
11 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2746 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

12 Burnham, 110 S.Ct. at 2106.
13 Id. at 2117.
14 Id. at 2122 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is
that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are
physically present in the state"' 5 and that "[d]ecisions in the courts of
many States in the 19th and early 20th centuries held that personal
service upon a physically present defendant sufficed to confer jurisdiction, without regard to whether the defendant was only briefly in the
6
State or whether the cause of action related to his activities there."'1
While Justice Scalia's argument on these points was more detailed than normal, and he purported to reach unusually definite conclusions about what history showed, these aspects of his opinion are
not unusual: one would expect to find this kind of discussion of history in an opinion on personal jurisdiction. Another aspect of Justice
Scalia's opinion in Burnham, however, is quite remarkable. It is a
deliberate-almost boastful-refusal to offer any functional or policy
arguments why courts should be allowed to establish personal jurisdiction in this way. Having established to his satisfaction that there is
a traditional rule that a state may obtain personal jurisdiction by serving a person temporarily in the state, Justice Scalia refused to identify
any policy basis for the rule. Instead he specifically asserted: "We
have conducted no independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule, leaving that judgment to
the legislatures that are free to amend it; for our purposes, its validation is its pedigree . . .,,
Justice Scalia recognized that the Court's opinions defining the
due process clause limits on personal jurisdiction often addressed the
"desirability or fairness" of the rule in issue. But he explained that
those cases were considering new rules, not traditional rules. New
rules might need a functional justification; traditional rules, Justice
Scalia asserted, did not.
B.
Justice Scalia's opinion in Rutan 18 took this approach to tradition one step further. The issue in Rutan was whether the first
amendment forbids the government from engaging in patronage hiring-that is, discrimination in favor of members of one political party
in hiring (and promotions, transfers, and recalls) for government jobs.
15 Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110.
16 Id. at 2111.

17 Id. at 2116 (emphasis added).
18 Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2746 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy. Justice
O'Connor also joined parts of it, but she explicitly did not join the parts discussing the role of
tradition.
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In two earlier cases, Elrod v. Burns 19 and Branti v. Finkel,2" the Court
had held that the first amendment prohibits patronage dismissals. In
Rutan, the Court extended that rule to hiring.
Patronage is a complex issue, as a matter of both political science
and first-amendment law. Justice Scalia's dissent in Rutan did make
functional arguments about the importance of patronage, and he argued that Elrod and Branti could be distinguished. But he emphasized two other points that provide a striking illustration of the
divergence between his attitude toward precedent and his view of tradition. He said that even though Elrod and Branti could be distinguished, they were so unsound that they should be overruled. At the
same time that he dismissed these precedents, though, he asserted that
the traditional acceptance of patronage alone--quite apart from any
functional justifications--established that patronage hiring did not violate the first amendment.
In his opinion, Justice Scalia essentially set out two priority rules
for determining when a practice violates the Constitution. First, he
said, the Court should consider the plain language of the constitutional provision. That seems mostly noncontroversial. But then, he
said, remarkably, any practice that has been traditionally accepted
should be upheld, so long as it is not inconsistent with the plain
language.
His argument to this effect reflects a distinctive, highly traditionalist view of the purposes of the Constitution:
The provisions of the Bill of Rights were designed to restrain transient majorities from impairing long-recognized personal liberties.
They did not create by implication novel individual rights overturning accepted political norms. Thus, when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the
endorsement of a long tradition 'of open, wide-spread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we
have no proper basis for striking it down.2

Justice Scalia then added a passage that seems almost consciously to
echo Burke:
Such a venerable and accepted tradition is not to be laid on the
examining table and scrutinized for its conformity to some abstract
principle of first-amendment adjudication devised by this Court.
To the contrary, such traditions are themselves the stuff out of
which the Court's principles are to be formed. 22
19 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
20 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
21 Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22 Id.
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The contrast between substantial traditions and concocted abstractions, the suggestion that the Court is arrogant in enforcing the
latter at the expense of the former, the hint that the Court is acting in
a cold-blooded, even blasphemous way by dissecting venerable traditions: all of these are profoundly Burkean notions. How can it be
that a Justice who says these things is simultaneously criticized, on
Burkean grounds, for his hostility to precedent?
C.
Michael H 23 is the other side of the coin. Justice Scalia's Burnham and Rutan opinions described the circumstances in which, in his
view, tradition was sufficient to uphold an institution. In Michael H,
he discussed when tradition might be sufficient to invalidate a practice. Michael H. was the natural father of a child whose natural
mother had been married to and living with another man at all relevant times. He challenged, as a violation of substantive due process, a
California statute that conclusively (so far as the case was concerned)
presumed that a child born to a woman living with her husband was a
child of the husband. The effect of the statute was to deny visitation
rights to Michael H.
Justice Scalia-writing a plurality opinion for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor-asserted that in
construing the substantive component of the due process clause, the
Court had "insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a
'liberty' be 'fundamental' (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our
society."' 24 The purpose of the due process clause, he continued, "is to
prevent future generations from lightly casting aside important traditional values-not to enable this Court to invent new ones."' 25 Justice
Scalia concluded that under this standard, Michael H.'s claim was
easy to reject:
Thus, the legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the
relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and [the
mother] has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our society .... We think it impossible to find
that it has.2 6
Justice Brennan, in dissent, objected that Justice Scalia took too

narrow a view of the relevant tradition. To the extent tradition was
23 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
24
25

Id. at 2341.
Id. at n.2.

26 Id. at 2342.
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material, Justice Brennan said, the question was not whether a relationship like that between Michael H. and the mother was traditionally protected, but whether "parenthood" was traditionally valued.27
Justice Scalia replied in an important footnote from which Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy specifically disassociated themselves. He
said:
Though the dissent has no basis for the level of generality it would
select, we do: We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right

can be identified.2"
The relevant tradition, therefore, was not the traditional treatment of parents generally, but the "tradition ... regarding the rights
of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived
....
And
'3 0
"2

that tradition "unqualifiedly denies protection to such a parent.
There is much to be said about Justice Scalia's views of the role
of tradition in constitutional interpretation. But for now what is significant is the highly important role tradition plays for him, and the
contrast between that role and his readiness to overrule precedent.
For purposes of procedural due process, according to Justice
Scalia, "pedigree" alone is sufficient to establish the constitutionality
of an institution. For purposes of substantive due process, no practice
that lacks a pedigree is constitutionally protected. That a practice
belongs to a general category that is traditionally protected is not sufficient, if the specific practice in question is traditionally condemned.
When a more specific constitutional provision is invoked, the text
governs; but if the text is inconclusive, the next resort is to tradition.
At that point the rule is that if a government practice is traditional, it
is also constitutional.
If these aspects of Justice Scalia's views are taken at face value,
he is not guilty-as the Burkean criticism of him, and indeed his attitude toward precedent, suggest--of arrogantly enforcing abstract conceptions he favors in the face of the collected wisdom of the ages. On
the contrary, he is deeply respectful of tradition and gives it near primacy in interpreting the Constitution.
II.

TRADITION AND THE REFUSAL TO FOLLOW PRECEDENT

At first blush it seems highly paradoxical to say that a Justice
who genuinely venerates tradition can hold Justice Scalia's attitude
27 Id. at 2350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28 Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6.
29

Id.

30

Id.
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toward precedent. But in fact there is no paradox. Precedent overlaps tradition; it is not subsumed by it. Some precedents may be said
to be part of a tradition. But not all are. Some are simply the decisions of a group of judges rendered a few years ago. Burke's injunction-not to cast aside the accumulated wisdom of generations,
gained through trial and error, in favor of abstractions--does not call
for such precedents to be sustained. On the contrary, it calls for them
to be discarded.
It is one thing if a judicial precedent has been followed on many
occasions, has become widely accepted by society, and has created a
web of institutions dependent on it. Then Burkean conservatism
would call for honoring it. More precisely, it would call for honoring
the consensus and network of institutions that have grown up around
it.
There is, in fact, some basis for saying that Justice Scalia does
not approach precedents of this kind with his characteristic willingness to build from the ground up. For example, Justice Scalia appears
to accept the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment, even though there is a very strong textual argument, and
at least a decent historical argument, against incorporation. (Recall
that Justice Scalia considers the text to take priority over everything
else, and he has characterized himself as an originalist who relies on
the intentions of the Framers as revealed historically.) Indeed, Justice
Scalia has aggressively relied on incorporation in arguing for his positions.3 And Justice Scalia has accepted an interpretation of the eleventh amendment that is at odds with its text but is based on a centuryold precedent. 2
It is a different matter if a precedent is relatively recent and has
not met widespread acceptance-especially if the precedent itself
overturned a widespread practice. Then the precedent itself may be
the arrogant abstraction that challenges the wisdom of the ages. A
good Burkean conservative should be quite ruthless toward precedents of that kind. Burke did not approve the actions of the French
Revolutionaries just because they had occurred. If he had had a
3' In his dissent in Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
Justice Scalia repeatedly invoked the text of the sixth amendment's confrontation clause and
criticized the Court for engaging in a balancing approach inconsistent with the language of
that clause. He did this even though the sixth amendment applies only to the federal government, and the only constitutional provision literally applicable in Craig was the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment-which, when it applies of its own force, is usually interpreted to prescribe balancing.
32 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2297 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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chance to restore the monarchy, he would have done so. A Burkean
judge would have the same attitude toward a relatively recent decision
that swept away a long-established institution.
Burke is sometimes presented as a sort of wise, level-headed
counsellor of prudence and humility against an overly intellectual,
hot-headed, arrogant impulse to remake the world. That is the view
of Burke invoked by critics of Justice Scalia's attitude toward precedent. It undoubtedly captures an important side of Burke. But there
is another side of Burke as well, one that is less comfortable. It is the
angry, desperate side: the Burke who thought that the world, after the
French Revolution, was out of joint and urgently needed to be set
right. That is the side of Burke reflected in Justice Scalia's views
about tradition. That side of Burke, that kind of conservatism, need
have no more tolerance for recent precedents inspired by judges' abstract ideas, than Burke himself had with innovations inspired by the
French Revolution.
The reconciliation of traditionalism with a willingness to overrule precedent is even more complete if another element is added to
the mix. That is suspicion of judges. Any theory of judicial review
must rely on some premises, implicit or explicit, about how judges
characteristically behave-their strengths and weaknesses, their "institutional capacities," as they are called. It would be plausible for a
Burkean to distrust judges. This is ironic: Burke's formulations of
how society should change seem to use the development of the common law as a model, and there is reason to think this was conscious
on Burke's part.33
Judges, however, are deliberately removed from society, and
there is a greater likelihood they will be out of touch with its practical
concerns. They also come from an intellectual segment of society that
is likely to value abstractions. The concern that judges will be too
quick to discard tradition because it does not correspond to abstract
ideas ought to come naturally to a Burkean. This solidifies the idea
that precedents are dispensable, especially when they overturn traditions; those precedents are likely to have been the work of judges who
were insufficiently respectful of tradition.
Justice Scalia's writings, on and especially off the Court, often
invoke the danger that judges will impose their "personal predilections." This is, for example, his principal defense of originalism-that
for all its difficulties, originalism (he asserts) at least provides a more
definite rule, while any other approach will leave judges free to act on
33 See, J.G.A. Pocock, Burke and the Ancient Constitution:A Problem in the History of
Ideas, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME 202 (1971).

HeinOnline -- 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1707 1990 - 1991

1708

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1699

the basis of their own views. a4 Justice Scalia's opinions on tradition
sound the same note. For example, in Michael H., in defending his
position that the most specific tradition is to govern, Justice Scalia
argued that "general traditions provide such imprecise guidance
[that] they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society's
views." 3 And he concluded his discussion of this point by asserting
that "[a]lthough assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of leaving
judges free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a rule of law that binds neither by text 3nor
by any particular,
6
all."
at
law
of
rule
no
is
tradition,
identifiable
In principle, therefore, one might see in Justice Scalia's work a
coherent, Burkean approach to the law. Tradition is venerated.
Apart from unequivocal textual commands, it is the principal source
of constitutional law. Prior decisions per se, however, do not have the
same claim. That is because they may reflect just the abstract theories
of individual judges, rather than the hard-won lessons of years of experience. Especially when those decisions overturned traditional
practices, judges should not hesitate to disregard them.
III.

THE VICES OF JUDICIAL TRADITIONALISM

There are three problems with the traditionalism I have attributed to Justice Scalia. One is that this coherent approach is not consistently his. The second is that he does not justify it. The third is
that it is not remotely an acceptable approach.
A.
Justice Scalia's traditionalism, especially that of Rutan and
Burnham, is highly majoritarian. Unless the Constitution is clear, a
majority can make any practice constitutional just by sustaining it for
a time. The first place to look to test Justice Scalia's consistency,
therefore, is to cases in which he is not a majoritarian. What one finds
in those opinions is abstract reasoning-not a careful demonstration
that the practices he condemns were not really traditional practices.
For example, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 7 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, determined that a form of state regulation of property violated the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment. In Pennell v. City of San Jose,3" Justice Scalia, in dissent,
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344 n.6 (1989).
Id.
37 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
38 485 U.S. 1, 15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3,4
35
36
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urged that a rent control statute effected an unconstitutional taking.
Judging from Justice Scalia's remarks in Rutan, one would expect a
detailed discussion of the traditional forms of regulation of property
in America. But except for a few brief and conclusory assertions that
were not at the core of the opinion's reasoning, Justice Scalia paid
very little attention to tradition.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.39 is a more dramatic example. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion condemned as unconstitutional (in quite strong terms) a minority set-aside plan adopted by
Richmond, Virginia, to channel more government contracts to African-American contractors. In particular, he emphasized an argument
that African-Americans are "the dominant racial group" in Richmond; this, Justice Scalia suggested, heightened the injustice. ° One
might have expected Justice Scalia to consider whether there is a tradition of ethnic groups using local government power to benefit themselves in this way. One might especially have expected this because in
his Rutan opinion, Justice Scalia argued that one desirable feature of
a patronage system is that it enables "racial and ethnic minorities" to
advance themselves by "dominating a particular party 'machine' [and
thereby] acquir[ing] the patronage awards the machine had power to
confer."'" But instead the Croson opinion relies entirely on abstractions about affirmative action.
An increasingly important element in Justice Scalia's nonjudicial
writings is also in tension with the traditionalism of Burnham, Rutan,
and Michael H. That is his emphasis on the need for courts, especially the Supreme Court, to announce clear rules rather than more
open-ended standards that allow for particularistic judgments. 42 The
antinomy between rules and discretion is an unavoidable part of any
system of ordering behavior, and there is obviously much to be said
on the "rules" side that Justice Scalia has taken. But while this approach is not inconsistent with traditionalism, the two will not always
mesh well.
There can be discretionary traditions, such as the probable cause
standard traditionally applied to searches and seizures by law enforcement agents, or the discretion traditionally afforded to administrative
officers under both the old law of mandamus and the newer arbitrary
39 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
40 Id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring).

41 Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2755 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice

Scalia carefully added that ethnic groups did this "on the basis of their politics rather than
their race or ethnicity," id., but it is utterly implausible to suggest that patronage machines
were blind to ethnicity.
42 See Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cni. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
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and capricious standard. There can also be heterogeneous traditions
that are difficult to capture in rules. For example, the American system of separation of powers has developed partly along functional
lines that paid little regard to the specific strictures of the Constitution, and partly along strict textual lines.4 3 Justice Scalia's opinions in
the area do not even attempt to say which is the tradition; indeed they
pay little attention to tradition at all. Instead, they are guided by
Justice Scalia's abstract conceptions about the separation of powers.'
B.
Traditionalism of the' kind described in Justice Scalia's Burnham,
Rutan, and Michael H. opinions is also very difficult to defend. It
looks very much like the exact position that Holmes called revolting-that there is no reason to uphold a practice other than that it
dates from Henry IV, or George III. Burnham is a defiantly antiLegal Realist opinion; it is also almost an anti-reason opinion. It
seems to acknowledge no obligation to explain its result, except to say
that tradition requires it.
Justice Scalia has not undertaken systematically to defend his
traditionalism, but he has suggested two justifications for it. One is
that traditionalism is a corollary of originalism. At one point in
Burnham, he suggested that the crucial question was how well the
practice (of obtaining personal jurisdiction by service in the territory)
was established in 1868, when the fourteenth amendment was
adopted.4 5

This justification, effectively converting traditionalism into one
version of originalism, raises many of the familiar questions associated
with the latter. In particular, what reason is there to believe that the
people who wrote and adopted certain constitutional provisions
meant to protect, for all time, the particular practices in which they
engaged? Justice Scalia does not identify any extraneous evidence
showing that they held this view, and that is certainly not what they
said in the text of the Constitution. They could have codified what
was then the law of personal jurisdiction, but they did not. "Due
process of law" is an odd way to effect such a codification. In fact,
their choice of an open ended phrase instead of a codification is excellent evidence that Justice Scalia is exactly wrong-that they deliberately chose not to protect forever that which was familiar to them.
43

Compare Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) with INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919

(1983).

44 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45 Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111.
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Justice Scalia's other defense of his traditionalism is parallel to
the defense he offered for originalism: it is needed to keep judges in
line, to keep them from imposing their personal views. But Justice
Scalia did not set out to defend this argument systematically, and a
systematic defense would be very complex, both empirically and
conceptually.
To begin with, this argument does not identify the theoretically
correct way to interpret the Constitution. Justice Scalia's defense of
traditionalism (and originalism-the same points apply) is that the
principal alternative way of interpreting the Constitution is too dangerous because it allows judges to act on the basis of their predilections. He does not contend that the traditionalist answer is what the
Constitution actually prescribes. It is just that, according to him,
judges will come closer to what the Constitution prescribes if they try
to be traditionalists.
In order to evaluate that claim, one must have an account of
what the Constitution does prescribe. Without such an account, one
cannot determine whether traditonalism or some other approach
comes closer. That is, if there were no bounded rationality problemif a judge had the capacity to do exactly what Justice Scalia wants her
to do-what would Justice Scalia tell her? Justice Scalia does not answer this question. And without an account of what the Constitution
really requires, it is impossible to determine whether he is correct in
saying that traditionalism will yield the closest approach to that ideal.
The second question is an empirical one. When Justice Scalia
talks about a judge who follows his or her own predilections, he does
not have in mind a corrupt judge. Rather he seems to have in mind
one who follows her own moral views; she does what seems to her to
be the right thing to do.
It is far from obvious that such a judge will miss the "true"
meaning of the Constitution by much. The assertion that she will
come closer if she follows a traditionalist course is simply not convincing. In fact, it is apparent (as I will discuss presently) that traditionalism leads to results that are utterly unacceptable. A judge who
follows his or her own "predilections" is likely to do better. If I had
to choose (behind some suitable veil of ignorance) between a judge
who always did what she thought was traditional and a judge who
always did what she thought was right, I am certain I would choose
the latter.
C.
In fact, traditionalism is just not an acceptable creed. At bottom
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neither Justice Scalia nor anyone else arguably within the legal mainstream today accepts its implications. To make the obvious and blunt
point, there are ugly, even unspeakable traditions in our history.
In his Rutan opinion, Justice Scalia addressed this issue, in connection with (of course) Brown v. Board of Education.46 The traditionalist, Burkean case in support of segregation was a strong one,
and in court the defenders of segregation made traditionalist (as opposed to overtly racist) arguments. Segregation was a tradition of
long standing;4 7 it was a local adaptation to a complex, intensely practical problem; Justices who lacked practical experience should not
have judged it on the basis of abstract ideas.
Justice Scalia's effort to reconcile his traditionalism with Brown
is so obviously contrived that it gives the game away: traditionalism is
just not an acceptable approach.
I argue for the role of tradition in giving content only to ambiguous
constitutional text; no tradition can supersede the Constitution. In
my view the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of "equal protection of the laws," combined with the Thirteenth Amendment's
abolition of the institution of black slavery, leaves no room for
doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race are
invalid. Moreover, even if one does not regard the Fourteenth
Amendment as crystal clear on this point, a tradition of unchallenged validity did not exist with respect to the practice in Brown.
To the contrary, in the 19th century the principle of "separate-butequal" had been vigorously opposed on constitutional grounds, litigated up to this Court, and upheld only over the dissent of one of
our historically most respected Justices.4 8
I do not know of anyone-from the drafters of the equal protection
clause (who in all probability did not think they were outlawing segregation at all, much less explicitly), to the advocates in Brown, to any
commentator since Brown, pro or con-who thinks the plain language
of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments "leaves no room for
doubt" that segregation is unconstitutional. The reference to the first
Justice Harlan is neatly circular, since by far the act that caused him
to be most "historically ... respected" was his dissent in Plessy. And
it is certainly odd that a constitutional challenge that garnered only a
46 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47 C. Vann Woodward's famous monograph, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d

rev. ed. 1966), undermined the pedigree of segregation to some degree, showing that rigid,
state-enforced Jim Crow did not follow immediately on Reconstruction but dated only from
the turn of the century. But public school segregation, unlike some other manifestations of
Jim Crow, "appeared early and widely[, was] sanctioned by Reconstruction authorities... and
prevailed continuously." Id. at 24.
48 Rutan v. Republican Party , 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2748 n. l (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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single dissent disestablished the segregation tradition, while the very
strong movement against the spoils system-which achieved nearly
complete success on the federal level in 1883 and even greater success
in many states 9-did not disestablish the tradition of patronage.
Racial discrimination is, of course, not the only deeply rooted
tradition that should not survive. Even Justice Scalia will have a difficult time explaining how the fourteenth amendment "leaves no
doubt" that discrimination against women is unconstitutional. (Section two of the fourteenth amendment contains gender discrimination.) And that is a deeply rooted tradition indeed. There are other
candidates: school prayer, many law enforcement practices, malapportioned legislatures.
In fact, as this list suggests, the kind of precedent that a traditionalist is most likely to want to discard is the kind of decision that
made the Warren Court famous. In their dissents, especially in the
criminal procedure and reapportionment area, Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan made, in many ways, the Burkean case against the Warren court. In the name of an abstract ideal of equality, they said, the
Court was sweeping aside institutions painstakingly built up over time
by generations. Those institutions may have been flawed, to be sure,
but they embodied a series of practical adaptations that should not
have been sacrificed in the name of an abstraction by judges who were
far too remote to understand the complexity of the problem. 0
The descriptive part of this traditionalist criticism was correct.
The Warren Court did uproot traditional institutions. It was moved
by abstract ideas rather than by deep attention to empirical detail.
There was a risk that the Justices simply did not understand the practical complexity of the problem. But the Warren Court initiatives
that were most controversial at the time-Brown, school prayer, 5 reapportionment,5 2 and the reform of state criminal procedure 53-are
today widely accepted, notwithstanding the strong traditionalist arguments against them.
The antitraditional character of the Warren Court finally brings
into focus both the true nature of Justice Scalia's traditionalism and
why it is truly paradoxical. I have suggested that Justice Scalia's
traditionalism can be reconciled with his disdain for stare decisis if
one recognizes that his traditionalism takes the form not of a cool
49 The Pendelton Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403, established a merit system for the selection of

federal civil service employees.
50 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51 School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
52 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
53 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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counsel of restraint and humility but of an urgent sense that something has gone awry and that the world should be returned to its
older, more solid, traditional foundations. Certain recent developements are, for Justice Scalia, what the French Revolution was for
Burke: a source not of new traditions to be accepted but of innovations to be overthrown, in the name of deeper traditions, as soon as
possible. Justice Scalia is far from alone in this attitude; among many
who might be called New Right legal theorists, there is the same (or
an even more pronounced) angry tone that constitutional
law has
54
state.
true
its
to
returned
be
must
and
awry
badly
gone
The paradox, or at least the oddity, is this: what recent developments are Justice Scalia, and the other New Right theorists, so upset
about? One's first inclination is to say (vaguely but usefully) that their
bite noire, their French Revolution, was the Warren Court; as I
noted, Warren Court precedents neatly fit the description of the kind
of decisions that a Burkean traditionalist would want to discard.
But which Warren Court precedents, exactly, are so deplorable?
Four important lines of Warren Court decisions were the most controversial, and most criticized, at the time: Brown and other racial
discrimination decisions (which produced the most sustained and violent oppostion); incorporation and the reform of criminal procedure
(the former was vigorously criticized by the Frankfurter and Harlan
dissents, while the latter was by far the focus of the most sustained
attacks by politicians); the school prayer decision (which probably
elicited the most widespread public opposition of any Warren Court
action); and the reapportionment decisions (which were the most
widely criticized by academics).
Not only does Justice Scalia (like other New Right theorists)
have little trouble with any of these decisions today; he, and they,
affirmatively embrace most of them. Everyone endorses Brown. As I
mentioned, Justice Scalia is enthusiastic about incorporation; he has
shown no disposition to overrule Warren Court precedents on criminal procedure, and indeed he is probably more favorable to the rights
of criminal defendants than the dominant sentiment on the current
Court. The basic validity of the reapportionment decisions has become a settled issue among virtually all segments of opinion in the
legal community. Moreover, the most widely criticized aspect of the
reapportionment cases-the Court's insistence on a rigid rule of "one
person one vote" instead of a more flexible approach that would preclude only gross and senseless malapportionment-is firmly in line
54

See, e.g., R.

BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA

(1990).
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with Justice Scalia's emphasis on the need for clear rules. And while
the contours of the school prayer decisions remain controversial (in
connection with "moment of silence" laws, for example), no substantial segment of the legal community, including the New Right, endorses the constitutionality of official, sectarian school prayer of the
form that existed before the Warren Court.
So what is upsetting to the traditionalists? What was the French
Revolution that Justice Scalia and others like him seek to uproot?
Since Justice Scalia agrees with the central Warren Court precedents,
what accounts for the evident sense that the law has gone awry and
must be redirected?
The answer seems to be not specific decisions, but an attitudean orientation toward constitutional law and the role of the courts.
The orientation is that the courts should be alert to help the less welloff in society. The egalitarian orientation of the Warren Courtrather than any of its specific decisions-is the target. Justice Scalia's
reverence for tradition and dislike of precedent are consistent because
they derive from the same source: a profoundly antiegalitarian substantive agenda.
IV.

CONCLUSION: ON THE PERILS OF METHODOLOGICAL
CRITICISM

Traditionalists are not alone, of course, in their willingness to
overrule precedent. Anyone with a strong substantive theory of constitutional interpretation will find precedents that are unacceptable.
It does not matter whether that theory is originalism, or textualism
(which may differ from originalism), or radical majoritarianism, or a
theory of representation reinforcement, or the view that the Constitution should be interpreted in a way that protects those who are powerless in society. Superficially it is more paradoxical that a traditionalist
like Justice Scalia would also want to overrule some precedents. But
the paradox is only superficial; in an era like ours, in which recent
history includes the Warren Court's attempts to challenge entrenched
practices, it is not at all surprising that a Burkean traditionalist would
be generally hostile to precedent.
Commonly, those who disagree with a Justice's substantive approach to the Constitution will concentrate their criticisms not on the
approach but on matters of method. The classic example is the argument that Lochner'--or, for that matter, Roe 56_is wrong not be55 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
56

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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cause it reflects a mistaken view about what values the Constitution
protects but because the Court invented a right that is not in the Constitution. Criticism of Justice Scalia for not following precedent follows these same lines.
This form of criticism is obviously often useful. Justices ought to
be criticized if they are insufficiently deferential to precedent, or history, or text, or the political process. And methodological criticism
has a potential for building bridges across substantive and political
divides; people who cannot agree on anything else might agree on a
point of method.
But the development of constitutional law in this century teaches
two lessons about this form of criticism. One is that it is impossible
(at least it has so far proved impossible) to define a single, homogenous method-literalism, or originalism, or deference to the legislature, or some version of a Carolene Products57 approach-that does
not sometimes produce utterly unacceptable results. The second is
that the alliances between method and substance shift almost rhythmically. Holmes and Brandeis used skepticism about whether the
Constitution really embodied substantive values to emphasize the importance of deference to the political process, and they brought about
results that progressives favored;58 Justice Frankfurter, and now Chief
Justice Rehnquist, use similar methods to the opposite effect. Justice
Black's textualism was the engine of the reform of criminal procedure
and the opposition to McCarthyism;59 Judge Bork's and Justice
Scalia's textualism does not appeal to those who applauded Justice
Black. The counsels of concern for stare decisis that are now directed
at Justice Scalia would have been fatal to much that the Warren
Court did.
Methodological criticism has a way of becoming obsolete at inopportune times. Justice Scalia's methodological claims, I have suggested, are the products of a substantive agenda that should be more
frankly acknowledged. By the same token, disagreement with that
agenda should not masquerade as criticism of Justice Scalia's methods. Those of us who lament the increasingly conservative nature of
the current Court should be careful about extolling precedent, and
criticizing Justice Scalia for not following it.
57

See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
59 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
58
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